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This paper develops a game-theoretic model of lobbying in which a politician sells access
to interest groups. The politician sets an access fee, or the minimum contribution necessary to
secure access, and an interest group that pays this fee can share veriable evidence in favor of
its preferred policy. The more the politician knows about interest group evidence, the better
able he is to identify and implement the welfare-maximizing policy. In equilibrium, a wealthy
interest group must pay more for access than an otherwise similar poor group; and a group
involved with an important issue must pay less than an otherwise similar group involved with
a less-important issue. The politician sets higher-than-optimal access fees in order to increase
contributions. A contribution limit can improve constituent welfare by lowering the price of
access, which tends to result in a more-informed politician. However, a limit can also decrease
the range of issues for which the politician is willing to sell access, thereby reducing politician
information and constituent welfare. Although the optimal limit is binding for some issues, it
is never optimal to ban contributions.
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11 Introduction
The economics and political science literatures focus on two motivations behind political contribu-
tions. First, one may contribute in the quid pro quo exchange for policy favors. Second, one may
contribute to help a politician already in favor of one's cause fund his election. The literature has
largely overlooked a third reason for contributing: to secure access to a politician, where those with
access can in
uence the drafting of legislation or the politician's voting record through the provision
of information or arguments in support of one's preferred policy, or against a less-preferred option.
Although the rst two motivations may help drive contributions, there is substantial evidence
that the access motivation also has a signicant (if not stronger) in
uence on interest group con-
tributions.1 Despite this, few papers attempt to model the contributions-for-access story (I discuss
those that do in the Literature Review). This paper presents a simple model of lobbying in which
money buys access. I use the model to develop a better understanding of the interaction between
politicians and interest groups, and to analyze the impact of a contribution limit on payments and
policy outcomes.
A politician must choose a policy, but he is ex ante uncertain about the eects of dierent
choices. An interest group has private evidence in favor of its own preferred policy, which it can
veriably reveal to the politician only if the politician grants the group access. Unlike other models
of hard-information disclosure, the politician controls which interest groups receive access. He
can therefore require than an interest group provide a political contribution in exchange for the
opportunity to disclose its evidence. I refer to this required contribution as the access fee.
In this simple game, the politician sets an access fee, and an interest group decides whether or
not to pay the fee. If the group pays the fee, the politician becomes fully informed of its private
evidence in favor of its known position. When setting the access fee, the politician also has the
option of granting access for free, or not selling access at any price.
The politician cares about choosing the policy that is best for a representative constituent; and
the more he knows about the interest group's evidence, the more accurate are his beliefs about
this best policy. He also cares about collecting political contributions (which come from access
fee payments), and he nds granting access costly. Expected representative constituent welfare
1See for example, Herndon (1982), Langbein (1986), Wright (1990), Hall and Wayman (1990), Milyo et al. (2000),
Ansolabehere et al. (2002), Clawson et al. (1992), Schram (1995).
2is maximized when the politician has full information about the interest group's evidence. This
happens when the politician grants access for free, since then the interest group will always present
its evidence. If the politician charges a positive access fee, the group only buys access if its evidence
is of high-enough quality, otherwise it does not buy access (which happens with positive probability)
and the politician remains less than fully informed.
The model yields the following insights. The equilibrium access fee, set by the politician, is
strictly increasing in the interest group's wealth and strictly decreasing in the importance of the
issue. This means that the politician charges a wealthy interest group a higher price for access
than an otherwise similar poor group, and that access is relatively inexpensive for interest groups
involved with issues about which the politician (or his constituents) cares intensely. However, for
any group, the politician sets an access fee that is higher than the fee that would be preferred by the
representative constituent. In equilibrium, the politician trades o constituent welfare in order to
increase expected contributions. Interestingly, as interest groups become wealthier, the politician
tends to become more informed about policy, which improves expected constituent welfare.
The analysis identies competing positive and negative eects of a contribution limit. A con-
tribution limit may improve expected constituent welfare by reducing the price of access, which
tends to result in more access and a better-informed politician. However, a contribution limit also
reduces the politician's nancial incentive to grant access. For some issues, a limit may result in
the politician no longer nding it worthwhile to grant access. For these issues, the limit causes the
politician to refuse access at any (allowed) price, which tends to result in him being less informed
and choosing worse policy. When the contribution limit applies to many issues, I show that it is
always optimal from the standpoint of constituent welfare to impose a contribution limit that is
binding for some issues. Under the optimal limit, the politician will refuse to provide any access
for some issues. Banning contributions is never optimal.
2 Literature Review
This paper develops a game theoretic model of lobbying in which interest groups provide political
contributions to gain access to a politician. Access allows an interest group to present veriable
or hard evidence in favor of its preferred policy position. To my knowledge, only two other papers
3share this foundation. Cotton (2008) models political contributions when the politician auctions
o access to the highest bidders. Austen-Smith (1998) tells a similar story to the present paper, in
which the politician sets implicit prices for access.
Cotton (2008) shows how an interest group with more-persuasive evidence in favor of its pre-
ferred policy is willing to pay more to share its evidence with the politician compared to a similar
group with less-persuasive evidence. The politician not only learns about the evidence of interest
groups that win access; he also makes inferences about interest group evidence by observing the
political contributions. In equilibrium, the politician learns about the evidence quality of all in-
terest groups, even when he only gives access to some of the groups. A contribution limit distorts
the signaling power of the contributions, which results in a less-informed politician. When the
politician sells access to the highest bidder, a contribution limit has a strictly negative impact on
expected constituent welfare.
The results in Cotton (2008) depend on the assumption that the politician allocates access
through some form of auction mechanism, in which the probability an interest group wins access is
strictly increasing in the group's contribution. It is unclear, however, that the politician allocates
access in such a way. For example, an interest group that attends a $1000 per plate fundraiser for
a politician may expect some minimal amount of access. But the results in Cotton (2008) rely on
some uncertainty regarding whether the fundraiser attendee receives access, which may not be the
case. As I show in this paper, when the politician commits to access fees before collecting contri-
butions, a contribution limit no longer has a strictly negative impact on representative constituent
welfare. Furthermore, the model in Cotton (2008) suggests that total political contributions are
decreasing in the number of interest groups the politician provides access. This conclusion is not
only counterintuitive, but also not supported by the empirical evidence. For example, Langbein
(1986) nds that political contributions are increasing in the time spent by politicians meeting
with constituents and interest groups. In the present paper, given any access fee, contributions are
increasing in the amount of access.
In Austen-Smith (1998), the politician sets access fees, similar to in this paper. The primary
dierence between Austen-Smith (1998) and my paper involves the underlying information struc-
ture. The earlier paper develops a model in which there are multiple interest groups involved with
an issue, and interest groups dier in terms of their ex ante policy preferences relative to those of
4the politician. The paper considers how access fees depend on whether an interest group has similar
policy preferences to the politician. In the current paper, I x interest group policy positions and
assume there is only one interest group per issue. Although these assumptions may result in a
less realistic information structure, the resulting model allows for an intuitive analysis with greater
focus on interest group wealth dierences, issue asymmetries, and the impact of contribution limits.
This alternative focus allows me to better address questions central to the current policy debate
on campaign nance reform; particularly questions involving contribution limits.
Other \access" models, including Austen-Smith (1995) and Lohmann (1995), assume that infor-
mation is completely unveriable. Therefore, the presentation of information by itself can have no
impact on the politicians beliefs, and the impact that any piece of information has on the politician
depends on who provides it and how much money they attach to the information. This paper, as
well as Cotton (2008) and Austen-Smith (1998), make the alternative assumption that evidence
can have an impact on the politician's beliefs independent of who provides it, or the size of the con-
tribution attached to it. In other words, interest groups have hard evidence that they can disclose
to the politician.
The political-access framework diers from other models of hard information in that the politi-
cian has control over which interest groups have access to present information. Typically in the
hard information literature, an agent with private information can disclose its information when-
ever it chooses to do so (e.g., Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Bennedsen and Feldmann 2002, 2006,
Bull and Watson 2004, 2007). In the political-access framework, the politician determines which
interest groups receive access, and he is able to grant access based on political contributions. Once
an interest group receives access, it behaves as if it is in a more traditional game of hard information
disclosure, and will always present its evidence. As Milgrom and Roberts (1986) establishes, only
an interest group with the worst possible evidence will refuse to present when given access.
3 Game with One Issue
3.1 Model
There are two players: a politician and an interest group. The politician must choose a policy p
from a single-dimensional policy space on the real line. The politician prefers to set p as close to
5the ideal policy ^ p as possible; however, he is ex ante uncertain about the identity of ^ p. The interest
group prefers strictly higher p.
At the beginning of the game, the interest group draws private, veriable evidence regarding the
identity of ^ p. Consistent with the information structure developed in Cotton (2008), the interest
group's evidence consists of both evidence in favor of a higher policy choice, and evidence in favor
of a lower policy choice (or against a higher p). Let eh denote the strength of the evidence in favor
of a high p, and let el denote the strength of the evidence in favor of a low p, where both variables
are the realization of a random variable ^ e uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0;1]. The
ideal policy depends on both eh and el, where ^ p  eh   el.
Before choosing a policy p, the politician can grant the interest group access. If the politician
grants the group access, the interest group can send a message to the politician communicating its
evidence. Similar to the evidence itself, the message consists of two parts: mh which communicates
evidence in favor of a higher p, and ml which communicates evidence in favor of a lower p. The
interest group can downplay or ignore evidence, but cannot exaggerate it; therefore, mh 2 [0;eh]
and ml 2 [0;el]. It is straightforward to show that the interest group with access will reveal
the maximum amount of evidence in its favor, and the minimum amount of evidence against its
position. Thus, mh = eh and ml = 0.2 Therefore, the politician learns about the evidence in favor
of a higher p by giving the interest group access. Although the politician does not learn anything
about the evidence against a higher p, he is more informed about the ideal policy when he grants
the group access than when he does not grant the group access.
Although giving access to the interest group enables the politician to become better informed
about the ideal policy, granting access is costly for the politician, imposing on him a utility cost
of . The politician may require that the interest group pay a political contribution in order to
receive access. Let c  0 denote the access fee set by the politician. The politician commits to give
the interest group access if it provides contribution c. If c = 0, then the politician grants access to
the interest group for sure. If c is higher than the interest group would ever be willing to pay, the
politician is said to \not grant access."
Let a 2 f0;1g denote the interest group's contribution decision, where a = 1 if the group pays
2This paper's evidentiary structure is consistent with Bull and Watson (2007)'s normality condition, or, equiv-
alently, Lipman and Seppi (1995)'s full-reports condition. As these authors have shown, the interest group has an
incentive to reveal the maximum amount of favorable evidence, and the minimum amount of unfavorable evidence.
6price c. Let m denote the evidence revealed by the interest group. If the interest group does not
pay the access fee, then m = ;. If the group does pay the access fee, then it reveals all of the
evidence in favor of a higher p, and m = eh. The realization of m given access choice a can be
written m(a), where m(1) = eh and m(0) = ;. (If c = 0, the politician grants access to the group
and learns eh for sure.)
The social welfare function is W(p; ^ p;
) =  j^ p pj
, where the variable 
 represents the relative
importance of the politician's policy decision. 
 may be thought of as how much the representative
constituent cares about the issue for which the policy choice is made. 
 is the realization of a
random variable that is continuously distributed on R++ with distribution G and density g. Let G
denote the set of all continuous distributions on R++, where G 2 G. The variable 
 is realized at
the beginning of the game, before the politician sets a price of access.
Game Order
The game takes place as follows:
1. The politician observes 
. The interest group learns 
, eh, and el. The politician then
announces access fee c.
2. The interest group chooses whether to pay c. This decision is denoted by a 2 f0;1g. If the
interest group pays c, then the politician becomes fully informed about eh.
3. The politician chooses policy p.
States and Beliefs
Although the state of the world is technically given by the realization of eh, el, and 
, the
value el does not in
uence play during the game.3 Therefore, the formal consideration of states
and beliefs can ignore el, and focus instead on the realization of favorable evidence eh, and the
importance of the issue for social welfare 
.
The interest group knows both eh and 
 with certainty. The politician knows 
, but does not
observe the draw of eh. At the time the politician sets the price for access c, the politician's beliefs
about eh are given by the ex ante distribution of evidence quality. When the politician chooses a
3The politician does not observe e
l until the end of the game after the policy is implemented. The interest
group, although it observes e
l at the beginning of the game, will never reveal evidence against its preferred position.
Therefore, e
l has no impact on the interest group's strategy.
7policy, his beliefs about eh are consistent with Bayes Rule given the ex ante distribution of evidence
quality, the interest group's choice of whether to pay for access, and the revelation of evidence if
the interest group does receive access. Denote these updated beliefs by (a;m), where (a;m) may
be fully represented by an updated density function f. The value f(eh) gives the probability that
politician puts on the interest group having evidence eh, given his beliefs eh.
The politician is a Bayesian. Therefore, if the interest group pays for access (or if c = 0), the
politician fully learns eh; so f(eh) = 1 and f(e) = 0 for all e 6= eh.
Let E denote the ex ante expectations about the state of the world, and let E denote the
politician's expectations about the state of the world given beliefs .
Payos
The politician cares about the welfare of a representative constituent (or citizen), which is
maximized when he implements the ideal policy ^ p, and about collecting political contributions. The
variable 
 represents how much the representative constituent cares about the issue. Representative
citizen welfare, and politician policy payo is given by W(p; ^ p;
) =  j^ p pj
. Letting the parameter
 represent how much the politician cares about political contributions, the politician's utility is
UP(p;c; ^ p;
;a) = W(p; ^ p;
) + (c   )a
=  j^ p   pj
 + (c   )a.
The analysis assumes that  < v
2, which implies that the cost of providing access is less than the
maximum possible nancial incentive from doing so. As I show in the analysis, v
2 is the maximum
possible access fee. Any greater fee always results in no interest group buying access.
The interest group strictly prefers a higher policy choice p, and paying a lower contribution.
Let the parameter v denote how much the group cares about policy relative to money. Therefore,
the interest group's utility is
UIG(a;p;c) = vp   ca.
3.2 Contribution Equilibrium
The analysis solves for the pure-strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game, which I call
the contribution equilibrium. A complete description of the equilibrium must include the strategy
8proles for the interest group and the politician, as well as the politician's beliefs about the state
of the world at the time he chooses policy. The politician's beliefs must be consistent with using
Bayes' Rule on the ex ante distribution of evidence quality given the strategies of the interest group.
Each player's strategy must be a best response to the strategies of the other players, given their
beliefs.
Let the function C denote the politician's equilibrium choice of access fee, where C(
;v)
is the access price when the issue is of 
 importance and the interest group has wealth v. Let
the function P denote the politician's equilibrium policy choice, where P(a;m;) describes his
choice given a and m. Similarly, let the function A dene the interest group's equilibrium strategy,
where A(c;eh) is the group's choice of whether to pay for access given access fee c and the realized
evidence quality eh.
I solve for the equilibrium of the game using backward induction, rst solving for the politician's
policy choice, then for the interest group's choice of whether or not to pay the access fee, then nally
for the politician's choice of access fee. The equilibrium is described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In the contribution equilibrium of the access fee game:








2. The interest group buys access i its favorable evidence is strong enough,
A(c;eh) =
(
0 when eh  2c
v
1 when eh > 2c
v .
(2)













4. In the contribution equilibrium, the politician's beliefs  are such that
9(a) if a = 1, then
f(e) =
(
1 for e = eh
0 for all other e 6= eh; and




 e(c) for e 2 [0;  e(c)]
0 for all other e = 2 [0;  e(c)].
I will discuss the equilibrium strategies, starting with the policy choice at the end of the game.
Policy Choice
At the time the politician chooses policy, the interest group has already chosen whether to
pay the access fee, and all evidence revelation has already taken place. At this point, the politi-
cian's choice of policy cannot in
uence contributions. This means the policy choice can only
impact the policy portion of his utility function, and he will choose the policy that maximizes ex-
pected constituent welfare given his beliefs. The politician's equilibrium policy choice is therefore
P (a;m;) = Epo = Eeh   Eel. Since el is uniformly distributed on the unit interval, this
simplies to P(a;m;) = Eeh   1
2.
Notice that the equilibrium policy choice depends only on the politician's beliefs about eh.
Therefore, earlier actions only impact policy through their in
uence on .
Interest Group Behavior
The interest group chooses whether to pay access fee c. If it pays fee c, the politician fully learns
the value of eh and will choose policy P = eh   1






v   c. If the group does not pay c, then the politician relies on his expectations
regarding eh and chooses policy P = Eeh   1

















v   c. (4)
For any Eeh, if the interest group prefers to pay the fee for some evidence eh, then it will also
prefer to pay the fee for any higher evidence quality eh0  eh. Similarly, if the group prefers not to
pay the fee for some eh, then it will not pay the fee for any lower evidence quality eh0  eh. Since
this holds for all eh 2 [0;1], there must exist some cut-o value  e(c) such that for all eh <  e(c) the
10interest group does not pay access fee c, and for all eh >  e(c) the interest group pays c for access.4
Given the existence of  e and the uniform distribution of eh, it follows that when the group does
not buy access Eeh =  e
2.5
When eh = 2c
v , the interest group is indierent between buying access and not buying it at
fee c. Therefore,  e = 2c
v . When eh is higher than this, the benets of disclosing evidence strictly
outweigh the cost imposed by the fee. When eh is lower than this, the interest group prefers the
politician to act as if it has evidence quality  e
2 than to pay the fee and disclose its actual evidence
quality.
Access Fee
Determining the equilibrium access fee requires solving a straightforward optimization problem,
given interest group behavior and policy choice at later stages in the game. The politician's choice











 + (c   )A(c;eh)

dehdel. (5)
































. (I later show that the politician always chooses c from this range of values.)
The term inside the rst set of brackets is the politician's expected policy utility (and expected
constituent welfare) given access fee c. When c = 0, the interest group buys access for sure and
policy utility is maximized at  


4. As c increases, policy utility strictly decreases. The term inside
the second set of brackets is expected revenue given c. Inside this second term, (c   ) denotes





denotes the probability that
the interest group draws high-enough eh that it buys access at fee c.
4The value  e is not restricted to be positive. If  e < 0, then the politician will always buy access independent of
the realized e
h. Similarly, if  e > 1, then the politician will never buy access independent of the realized e
h.
5When the group does buy access, the politician learns e
h with certainty; therefore, Ee
h = e
h.














The term inside the rst set of brackets represents the impact that increasing the access fee has on
the politician's expected policy utility (and constituent welfare). Notice that this term is strictly
negative for all positive c. The term inside the second set of brackets represents the impact that
increasing the access fee has on expected revenue. When c = v
4 + 
2, this second term is maximized,
and for any access fee, moving the fee closer to this amount strictly increases expected revenue.
The politician will never prefer c greater than v
4 + 
2 since increasing c above this value results in
both lower policy utility and lower revenue.
Setting the expression 7 equal to 0 gives the rst order conditions for the politician's maximiza-
tion problem. Solving for c provides a closed-form solution for the equilibrium access fee C. The
solution is given in Proposition 1 by equation 12. Section 3.2.1 considers the characteristics of C
in more detail.
3.2.1 Characteristics of Equilibrium Access Fee
Proposition 2 describes the notable characteristics of the equilibrium access fee function C.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium access fee C is
















 < 0 for all 
 > 0










 ! 0, and
4. strictly positive





These results make intuitive sense. As the politician's cost of providing access  increases,
he increases the access fee to help oset this increase. The parameter v represents how much
the interest group cares about the policy choice relative to money. All else equal, as the interest
group becomes more wealthy, or as it becomes more concerned about the policy choice, the value
12Figure 1: Equilibrium access fee as a function of issue importance
v increases. As the proposition shows, in equilibrium the politician charges a higher price of access
to relatively wealthy interest groups compared with less wealthy groups.
The variable 
 represents how important the policy choice is to the representative constituent.
The proposition says that the politician charges a lower price for access to an interest group that
is involved with an issue that he considers important. As the importance of the issue increases,
the access fee falls, with the fee approaching (but never reaching) 0 in the limit. Conversely, for
issues not considered important by the constituents, the politician charges a relatively high price
for access. As the importance of the issue approaches 0, the access fee approaches v
4 + 
2, which is
the access fee that maximizes the politician's expected payment from the interest group minus the
cost of providing access.6 An illustration of C as a function of 
 is provided by Figure 1.
Although the politician's policy utility (and constituent welfare) is maximized if he sets an access
fee equal to 0, he will always set a positive access fee. This is because the politician cares about
collecting contributions as well as choosing the best policy. At a low-enough c, the marginal benet
to contributions (the right-hand portion of expression 7) will exceed the marginal cost to the policy
choice (the left-hand portion of expression 7). Compared to the case of c = 0, a marginally positive
6This is the access fee the politician would choose if his utility function did not incorporate constituent welfare,
and only included contribution utility (so, UP = (c   )a). When the politician cares{even just a little{about




2 < 1 is assured by the assumption that the cost of providing access is less than the benet from the maximum
possible access fee, or  <
v
2 .
13fee has essentially no eect on the policy choice. A marginally positive access fee means that only a
group with the lowest possible evidence quality will not buy access. When the politician sees that a
group does not buy access, he correctly infers that the group must have the lowest possible eh, and
therefore essentially remains fully informed about eh. Therefore, compared to c = 0, a marginally
positive access fee has strictly positive eect on expected politician payos since it has a positive
in
uence on expected contributions, and essentially no eect on the policy utility.7
3.3 Constituent Welfare
When the politician chooses an access fee, he is concerned with constituent welfare and political
contributions. His expected utility was given by equation 6. The term within the rst set of
brackets of this expression represents expected constituent welfare given access fee c. Given access































, expected constituent welfare is decreasing in the distance between the implemented






may be denoted Ej^ p pj. A lower value Ej^ p pj corresponds to a more-informed policy decision.
4 Aect of a Contribution Limit in One-Issue Game
Up until now, I assume there are no limits to the maximum size of the interest group's payment
to the politician. This section considers how the analysis changes if political contributions are
constrained. In particular, I am interested in the impact that a contribution limit has on social
7This does not imply that the optimal limit is 0. Furthermore, this same argument does not hold starting from
an already positive access fee. At a higher access fee, there is a range of e
h for which the interest group does not buy
access. Therefore, the politician is less than certain about the evidence quality of a group that does not buy access,
and a marginal increase in the access fee has a negative eect on the accuracy of the politician's beliefs about e
h.
14welfare.
The analysis rst determines the equilibrium access fee given any limit  c. I then describe the
impact a limit has on politician information and expected constituent welfare. Depending on issue
importance 
, the limit may have a positive or negative eect on politician information. The
potential positive eect results because the limit decreases the equilibrium access fee for a range of

. A lower fee means that the interest group is more likely to buy access and share its information
with the politician. The potential negative eect results because the politician may not nd it
worth his time to provide access when he can only charge a fee up to the limit. When the politician
does not oer access at any allowed price, he remains uninformed with probability 1. I show that
there exists a limit that improves constituent welfare, compared to the case when contributions are
unlimited. However, too strict of a limit decreases welfare.
Denote the contribution limit by  c  0. Under the contribution limit, the politician still chooses
the policy he believes is best at the nal period of the game. Furthermore, the limit does not
in
uence the interest group's willingness to pay for access. The limit only in
uences the politician's
ability to set the access fee. Any limit greater than the maximum equilibrium contribution has no







ban implies that  c = 0. Throughout this section, C, A, and P refer to the equilibrium strategies
for the game without a contribution limit, and C
 c, A
 c, and P
 c refer to the strategies under limit  c.
4.1 Equilibrium Under the Limit
The equilibrium access fee for the game with contribution limit  c is described by the following
proposition. The proposition also says that the interest group's access strategy and the politician's
policy strategy are unchanged by the imposition of a limit.











> > > > <





 c if 
 2 [ 
( c;v);
( c;v)]
; (no access) if 










 c = A, P
 c = P, and  c = .
The function 




is the value of 
 that solves C(
;v) =  c. To deal with the case of contribution bans, note that

(0;v) = 1 for any v. When the realized value of 
 is greater than 
( c;v), the politician prefers
to charge an access fee less than the maximum contribution, and the limit has no eect on the
access fee.8
The value  
( c;v) is the value of 
 at which the politician is indierent between selling access at
price  c, and not granting any access. For 
 <  
( c;v), the politician does not nd it worth his time
to grant the interest group access when he can only charge an access fee up to  c. For this range of 
,
the politician does not sell any access and remains fully uninformed about interest group evidence.
For 
 between  
 and 
, the politician is willing to provide access at a price equal to the
contribution limit; although he would prefer to set the fee above the limit. For this range of issue
importance, the politician sets the fee at  c.
The value  
( c;v) is strictly decreasing in  c, and for large enough  c it will be the case that
 
( c;v)  0.9 When this is the case, the cost to the politician of providing access is suciently low
such that, independent of how important the issue is, he still nds it worthwhile to sell access at
price  c.
An illustration of the access fee is provided by Figure 2 for the case when  
( c;v) > 0. For

 <  
( c;v), the politician does not sell access; therefore, the access fee function does not exist over
that range of values.
4.2 Welfare Eects of Limit for One Issue
In this section, I consider the eects that a limit has on politician information and welfare for
a single issue. I then identify the socially optimal limit, which maximizes expected constituent
8In the case of a contribution ban, there is no 
 for which this condition holds. Therefore, a ban in
uences behavior
for all potential issues.




2, the highest possible equilibrium access fee without the limit.
This is because, by assumption, the cost of providing access is suciently low such that for some feasible access fee
the politician nds granting access to the interest group worthwhile, even as the importance of the issue approaches
0.
16Figure 2: Equilibrium access fee under limit  c
welfare. Throughout this section, I assume that the limit only applies to a single issue with known

. The more realistic case, when a limit applies across multiple issues, is addressed in Section ??.
Expected constituent welfare under limit  c depends on how important the issue is, and the access
fee the politician charges given the limit. Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium contribution
function. When the politician charges an access fee c, expected welfare is given by expression 8.
When he does not sell any access, expected welfare is simply  


3, which is expected welfare when
the politician is completely uninformed about interest group evidence.
Lemma 1 For any issue 
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 <  
( c;v).
The following proposition comes from comparing equilibrium expected constituent welfare under
the limit (lemma 1) with equilibrium expected constituent welfare when there is no limit (equation
9).
Proposition 4 For any issue 
, compared to the case of no limit, contribution limit  c has
 no eect on politician information and expected constituent welfare if 
  
( c;v),
17 a positive eect on politician information and expected constituent welfare if 




 a negative eect on politician information and expected constituent welfare if 
   
( c;v).
Below, I provide intuition for these three possible eects: no eect, positive eect, and negative
eect.
No Eect { When the realized value of 
 is suciently high (i.e., greater than 
( c;v)), the
politician prefers to set an access fee below the contribution limit. For issue 
, imposing such a
contribution limit therefore does not aect his ability to set his desired access fee. Under the limit,
the politician sets fee C(
;v); just as he would if there was no limit. The limit has no eect on
politician information, his policy choice, or expected constituent welfare.
Positive Eect { For moderate realizations of 
 (i.e., when 
 is between  
( c;v) and 
( c;v)),
the politician prefers to charge an access fee greater than the contribution limit  c; however, he is
willing to grant access even if he can only charge a fee equal to the contribution limit. For these
issues, the contribution limit causes the politician to set a lower price for access than he otherwise
would. The lower access fee means a higher probability that the interest group buys access, as well
as more accurate beliefs about eh when the group does not buy access.10 This tends to result in a
more-informed politician, who is better able to identify and implement the ideal policy, and higher
expected constituent welfare.
Negative Eect { When the realized value of 
 is suciently low (i.e., less than  
( c;v)), the
politician prefers to charge an access fee above the limit, and he is not willing to sell access at a
fee equal to the limit. Although the politician would be willing to oer access at a high-enough
fee, the contribution limit prevents him from being able to charge a suciently high amount.11
The politician therefore does not grant any access, he learns nothing about the interest group's
evidence quality, and with probability 1 he remains fully uninformed about the ideal policy. This is
in contrast to when there is no contribution limit, and the politician becomes fully informed with
positive probability.12 This tends to result in a less-informed politician, who is less able to identify
10The more accurate beliefs in this case result from there being a smaller range of e
h for which the group chooses
not to buy access.
11For these values of 
, the costs of providing access  outweigh the expected informational and monetary benets
when the fee cannot exceed  c.
12Also note that when the politician grants no access, he is also less informed about the interest group's evidence
18and implement the ideal policy, and lower expected constituent welfare.
The ranges of 
 for which a contribution limit has positive, negative, or no eects depends
on how strict the limit is. Remember that  
 and 
 are both decreasing in  c. Increasing the
limit decreases the range of 
 for which there is a negative impact on politician information, and
increases the range of 
 for which there is no impact on information. A high enough limit results
in  
 < 0, which means that any limit will have an unambiguously non-negative eect on expected
constituent welfare. At the opposite extreme, a contribution ban means that 
(0) = 1, which
means that the limit will always have either a positive or negative eect on welfare. Furthermore,
a contribution ban results in the largest range of issues for which there is a negative eect.
4.3 Optimal Limit for One Issue
This section is concerned with the contribution limit that maximizes expected constituent welfare.
The optimal limit for issue (
;v) is denoted  co(
;v). Given the realization of 
 and v, the limit
 co(
;v) maximizes expected constituent welfare. If a contribution ban is optimal, then  co(
;v) = 0.
If it is optimal to impose no limit, then  co(
;v) = ;.
An overly-strict limit results in the politician not selling any access. A limit that is not strict
enough results in the interest group being willing to buy access for a smaller range of evidence
quality than might otherwise be possible. The optimal limit is dened by the following proposition.
Proposition 5 Let  c0 solve  
( c0;v) = 
. Then  co(
) = maxf0; c0g.
The optimal limit for the issue  co(
;v) equals either the lowest possible limit at which the
politician is willing to sell access or 0, whichever is greater. The lowest limit at which the politician
is willing to sell access results in the politician being indierent between selling access at a fee
equal to  co, and not selling any access. Any lower limit means that  
( c;v) > 
, and the politician
chooses not to sell access. In this case, the politician will remain completely uninformed about
interest group evidence, and increasing the limit to  co(
;v) tends to result in a more fully informed
politician. Any limit higher than  co(
;v) results in  
( c;v) < 
; for which case the politician charges
a higher access fee than he needs to cover the costs of providing access. If the limit is reduced to
quality compared to the situation when there is no limit and the group does not buy access. When the group does
not buy access in the no-limit case, the politician can still infer that the group has suciently-low evidence quality
such that buying access was not worthwhile.
19 co(
;v), the politician continues to sell access, but at a lower price. This tends for him to be more
informed, since the interest group is more likely to buy access.
When the optimal limit is imposed, the politician charges an access fee equal to the limit, which
is less than the fee he would charge is there was no limit. If the limit is too high, then the positive
eect of the limit is not as high as it otherwise could be. If the limit is too low, then the negative
eect of the limit is present, and the negative eect can be decreased by increasing the limit.
5 Game with Many Issues
Section 3 developed a model of access fees in which the politician chooses policy for a single issue.
The analysis found the equilibrium of such a model, and Section 4 determined the impact that a
contribution limit has on equilibrium behavior and expected constituent welfare.
It should be noted, however, that a contribution limit or ban typically applies to all contribu-
tions, not only the contributions of one interest group that is concerned with a specic issue. In
this section, I address this concern by expanding the one-issue model to incorporate many dierent
issues that may dier in terms of issue importance, interest group wealth, and ideal policy.
The politician must choose policy for each of many independent issues. Formally, there is a
continuum of issues, of total weight 1. There is one interest group per issue, that only cares about
its own issue's policy. For each issue, the game remains unchanged from the one-issue model.
Denote an arbitrary issue from this continuum by j. I use subscript j to denote a variable or
parameter specic to issue j, including politician policy choice pj, ideal policy ^ pj, access fee cj,
access decision aj, message mj, evidence (el
j;eh
j), interest group wealth vj, and issue importance

j. The parameters  and  are common across all issues.
The realized state of the world assigns values 
j, vj, and (el
j;eh
j) to each issue. For each issue,
the issue importance 
j is the independent realization of a continuously random variable with
distribution G and density g such that g(
) > 0 i 
 > 0. A higher realization of 
j means that the
politician cares more about issue j relative to other issues. The interest group preference parameter
vj > 0 is the independent realization of a random variable distributed according to H and density
h. A higher realization of vj means that interest group j is either more wealthy or cares more
intensely about the issue-j policy outcome. For each issue, the politician observes both 
j and vj
20at the start of the game. Just as in the one-issue game, however, he is initially uninformed about the
realized values of el
j and eh
j which are the independent realizations of a random variable uniformly
distributed on the unit interval. Interest groups face the same incentives as in the one-issue game;
therefore, an interest group with access will always fully reveal eh
j and reveal nothing about el
j.
Each interest group cares only about its own issue. Therefore, interest group j has utility
function
uIG
j (aj;pj;cj;vj) = vjpj   cjaj.
The politician's utility function for issue j is
uP
j (pj;cj; ^ pj;
j;aj) =  j^ pj   pjj
j + (cj   )aj.





( j^ pj   pjj
j + (cj   )aj)dj.
Assuming that politician utility is linear in the portion of interest groups to receive access
simplies the analysis, and ensures a closed-form solution for the equilibrium contribution function.
Let  denote the portion of all interest groups that receive access to the politician.
Before the beginning of the game, the politician observes 
j and vj for each issue, and each
interest group observes the 
j, vj, and (el
j;eh
j) associated with its own issue. The game takes place
in the following order.
1. For each issue, the politician sets an access fee cj.
2. Each interest group observes the access fee associated with its issue, and decides whether to
pay the fee. This decision is denoted by aj. Groups that pay the fee choose messages to send
the politician mj.
3. The politician observes interest group behavior, then for each issue he chooses a policy pj.
215.1 Equilibrium with No Limit
The analysis of the many-issue framework considers the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game,
which I label the contribution equilibrium with many issues. The equilibrium is described in Propo-
sition 6. It establishes that for any given issue, interest group and politician strategies are inde-
pendent of other issues. The equilibrium of any issue subgame is the same as the equilibrium of
the one-issue game with the same issue characteristics.
Proposition 6 In the contribution equilibrium with many issues, for each j:







































4. In the contribution equilibrium, the politician's beliefs  are such that
(a) if aj = 1, then
f(ej) =
(
1 for ej = eh
j
0 for all other ej 6= eh
j; and
(b) if aj = 0, then
f(ej) =
( vj
2cj for ej 2 [0;
2cj
vj ]
0 for all other ej = 2 [0;
2cj
vj ].
The intuition behind this equilibrium is the same as in the one-issue game. I therefore do
not go through each strategy again, but rather refer the reader to the discussion in Section 3.2.
22Furthermore, the results established by Proposition 2 hold regarding the characteristics of the
equilibrium access fee for any given issue. The politician assigns a relatively high access fee to
issues with relatively rich interest groups, and those for which he cares relatively little about the
policy outcome.
5.2 Equilibrium with Limit
A contribution limit  c aects each issue as it would have in the one-issue game. For certain issues,
it causes the politician to lower the access fee to the limit. For other issues, it causes the politician
to not sell any access.
Proposition 7 When there is a contribution limit  c, the contribution equilibrium with many issues
is such that, for each issue j,
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 c if 
j 2 [ 
( c;vj);
( c;vj)]
; (no access) if 









2. interest groups play strategy A
j, the politician chooses policy according to P
j , and  c = .
5.3 Expected Constituent Welfare
For any 
 and v, equation 8 gives expected constituent welfare when there is no contribution limit.
When there are many issues that dier in terms of 
 and v, expected constituent welfare is






































































23For important enough issues (i.e., when 
 is greater than  
( c;v)), the politician prefers to charge
an access fee below the limit, and the limit does not in
uence the equilibrium access fee. For this
range of 
, the limit has neither a positive nor a negative eect on politician information, and
expected constituent welfare is the same as it was without a limit (8). For any positive limit, there
exists a range of 
 for which this is the case.13
When issue importance is suciently low (i.e., when 
 is less than  
( c;v)), the politician is
unwilling to sell access for a fee that cannot exceed the limit (although he would oer to sell access
if he could set a high-enough fee). For these issues the politician remains fully uninformed about




3. This range of 
 has positive weight so long as  
( c;v) is positive.14
For 
 between  
( c;v) and 
( c;v) the politician is willing to sell access at a fee equal to the
contribution limit, although he would prefer to set the access fee above the limit. For these issues,
the limit causes the politician to set a lower access fee than he otherwise would have. By decreasing
the price of access, the limit has a positive eect on politician information, thereby improving
expected constituent welfare.15 It is always the case that 
( c;v) >  
( c;v) and 
( c;v) > 0;
therefore, there always exists a range of 
 for which the positive eect exists.
Depending on the model parameters including the distribution of 
, a contribution limit  c may
either increase or decrease ex ante expected constituent welfare. Compared to the case of no limit,
imposing limit  c increases expected constituent welfare when 
 is between  
( c;v) and 
( c;v), and
the limit decreases expected constituent welfare when 
 is less than  
( c;v). Whether the limit
increases or decreases ex ante expected constituent welfare depend on the distribution of 
, G.
13When contributions are banned (i.e.,  c = 0), all issues are aected. The politician always sets a positive access fee
when he is able to do so; therefore banning contributions aects his behavior on all issues. Formally, this is because


( c;v) ! 1 when  c ! 0.
14If  
( c;v)  0, then the politician is willing to sell access for any issue at a fee equal to the contribution limit. In
this case, there will not exist any 
 <  
( c;v).
15Since  c < C
(
;v) when 
 2 [ 
( c;v);



























The optimal limit maximizes EW c, which was given by equation 14. The derivative of EW c with





































To make the discussion more intuitive, I rewrite expression 15 to give the marginal eect of a







h(v)(Z1 + Z2)dv. (16)






















Given any interest group wealth parameter v, imposing a stricter limit increases the range of 

for which the politician does not sell any access, and for which the limit has a negative eect on
information. This eect is represented by Z1, which is strictly negative.16
At the same time, a stricter limit also reduces the average access fee on issues for which the
politician does sell access. This means that the interest group is more likely to buy access and the
politician become informed. Z2 represents this positive eect of a stricter limit on information and
welfare that is present for some range of 
. Z2 is strictly positive.
Without making assumptions regarding the distribution of 
, one cannot nd a closed-form
solution for the optimal contribution limit  co. One can, however, conclude the following.






1. EW co > EWno limit, and
2. EW co  EW c for all other  c  0.
Not only does Proposition 8 establish that an optimal limit exists, it also provides a range of





@ c < 0, Z1 < 0.
251. It is never optimal (for expected constituent welfare) to ban contributions.
2. It is always optimal (for expected constituent welfare) to set a contribution limit. Under the
optimal limit, the politician sells access for some, but not all, issues.
If contributions are banned, the politician only grants access for issues where the expected
policy benet of learning the interest group's evidence exceeds the time costs of granting access.
For any issue that the politician does grant access, the politician learns eh for sure. Now, consider
the impact of a marginally positive limit compared to a contribution ban. @EW c
@ c is strictly positive
at  c = 0, which means that increasing the limit above 0 improves constituent welfare. The intuition
for this follows. A positive limit increases the range of 
 for which the politician chooses to sell
policy{a welfare benet. A positive limit also decreases the probability that the interest group buys
access, which tends to decrease welfare since a politician is less likely to fully learn eh. This negative
impact on welfare is minimized when considering a marginally positive fee. This is because when
the politician sets a marginally positive access fee, only an interest group with the lowest possible
evidence quality does not buy access. When the group does not pay for access, the politician
correctly infers that the interest group has the lowest-possible eh, and the politician remains fully
informed about eh. A marginally positive limit causes the politician to grant access for a larger
range of issues (a benet) and does not result in him being less informed regarding any of the
issues. Therefore, a marginally positive limit is strictly better for expected constituent welfare
than a contribution ban.
If  c = 
, then  
( c;v) = 0 and the politician sells access at some fee for all issues. Any higher
contribution limit results in a higher access fee for some issues, but does not increase the range
of issues for which the politician does sell access (since he is already oering to sell access for all
issues). Therefore, setting the limit equal to 
 is better than setting a higher limit, or no limit at
all. Now, consider the impact of a limit that is marginally less than 
 compared to one equal to

. Evaluated at  c = 
,  @EW c
@ c > 0; therefore, a stricter limit improves constituent welfare. The
intuition is as follows. Imposing a stricter limit reduces the access fee associated with some issues,
which tends to have a positive impact on welfare. A stricter limit also means that for low-enough

 the politician will not sell any access, which tends to decrease expected welfare. For a limit just
below 
, the politician sells access for all issues except the least-important ones (those with the
26smallest possible 
). Such a limit causes the politician to become less informed about the least
important issues, and to become more informed about relatively important ones. The net eect of
such a limit on welfare is positive compared to a limit equal to 
.
Under the optimal limit, the politician sells access for some, but not all issues. That he does
not sell access for every issue follows from  co < 
 which means  
( co;v) > 0. That the politician
always gives access for some issues follows because he prefers to grant access to interest groups
concerned with issues for which he cares passionately (those with high-enough 
), even when he
does not have a monetary incentive to do so.
6 Conclusion
I develop a simple model of access fees in politics, and use it to analyze the impact of contribution
limits on policy choice and constituent welfare. The model, adapted from the evidence model in
Cotton (2008), has some signicant advantages. By xing the policy preferences of the interest
group, and using a relatively simple evidence structure, I am able to consider in detail the impact
of interest group wealth, the politician's cost of providing access, and the importance of the issue
for which the politician must choose a policy. This is in contrast to the earlier work by Austen-
Smith (1998) in which there is a more-complex evidence structure and interest groups dier in how
similar their preferences are to the politician. The focus of Austen-Smith (1998) is on how extreme
or moderate the interest groups that buy access are, and the paper says relatively little about the
relationship between access fees and interest group wealth or issue importance, or about the impact
of contribution limits (although there is a brief discussion).
This paper predicts that politicians charge higher access fees to more wealthy interest groups
relative to poor groups, and lower access fees to groups involved with relatively important issues.
Both predictions have strong intuitive appeal, and supporting empirical evidence. Furthermore, I
show that the politician tends to become more informed about interest group evidence and make
better policy decisions when the issue is more important. Interestingly, increasing interest group
wealth can improve expected constituent welfare.
The analysis identies positive and negative eects of a contribution limit. A limit has a positive
eect because it decreases the average access fee, which increases the probability that an interest
27group buys access. A limit has a negative eect because it may decrease the number of issues for
which the politician is willing to sell any access. When the politician cannot charge more than the
limit for access, he may not nd selling access for certain issues worth his time. (Although he will
always nd it worth his time to sell access for issues about which he cares passionately enough.)
The paper shows that, when the limit applies across many issues, it is always optimal to set a
contribution limit that results in the politician refusing to sell any access for some issues. I also
show that a contribution ban is never optimal. This result is in contrast to Cotton (2008) in which
limits have a strictly negative impact on politician information and constituent welfare. It is also
in contrast to the number of models in which the politician knows the ideal policy ex ante, and
allowing contributions enables the politician to trade policy favors that decrease constituent welfare
for contributions. Clearly the mechanism by which the politician allocates access has a signicant
impact on the welfare implications of a contribution limit. Future empirical work should attempt
to better understand the process by which politician's award access.
7 Appendix
Proof. (Prop. 1) Most of the proof for Proposition 1 is provided in the body of the paper in Section
3.2. Here, I provide the analysis that is not included in the body of the paper. The body of the paper fully
describes the derivation of P. A is fully derived, except for explicitly stating that  e = 2c
v is the value of
eh that solves expression 4 with equality. When eh = 2c
v , the interest group is indierent between buying
access at fee c and not buying access.
The derivation of C requires the simplication of the politician's expected utility function, given P
and A. Expression 5 states the interest groups expected utility, given his uncertainty regarding el and eh.






(c   )A(c;eh)dehdel = (c   )(1    e). (17)



















jpo   Pjdehdel. (18)
When eh >  e, the group buys access and the politician becomes fully informed about eh, and chooses
P = eh  1
2. When eh   e, the group does not buy access and the politician chooses policyEeh  1
2 =  e
2   1
2.



















































Now consider the rst part of expression 19. Let H denote the distribution of ^ p given that el 2 [0;1] and
eh 2 [0;  e]. The density of H is denoted by h, where h(^ p) = 1  
^ p
 e or ^ p 2 [0;  e]; h(^ p) = 1 or ^ p 2 [ e   1;0];
h(^ p) = 1
 e  
^ p
 e or ^ p 2 [ 1;  e   1]; and h(^ p) = 0 otherwise. The function h() is symmetric around ( e   1)=2
(which is the implemented policy P when the group does not buy access). One can therefore rewrite the






0 jeh   el    e 1









































 e   (1    e)


























After this is established, the body of the paper describes the rest of the process to derive C.
The derivation of equilibrium also requires the derivation of politician beliefs, . Beliefs must be consis-
tent with Bayes' Rule given equilibrium strategies. If the interest group pays the access fee, the politician
becomes fully informed about eh, and his beliefs must be such that f(eh) = 1. If the group does not buy
access, the politician can infer that eh   e. Given the ex ante uniform distribution of e, it is equally likely
that the interest group has any eh 2 [0;eh]. Therefore, f(e) = 1
 e for all e 2 [0;eh], and f(e) = 0 for e not
in this range.
Proof. (Prop. 2) Straightforward.
Proof. (Prop. 3) Imposing a contribution limit  c constrains the politician's choice of access fee, but does
not in
uence the politician's or interest group's preferences. Given any , the politician prefers to choose the
policy he believes is best for his constituents, P
 c = Eeh   1
2. Thus, P
 c = P. Given any fee, the interest
group prefers to buy access whenever eh > 2c
v . Thus A
 c = A. Given that the interest group's access decision
29does not change for any given fee c, the politician's beliefs about the interest group's evidence quality also
will not change. Thus,  c = .
Similarly, for any 
 the politician prefers to choose the same access fee as he did in the game without a
limit. Function C, dened in Section 3.2, gives the politician's preferred access fee for any issue, 
. When
C(
)   c, the politician chooses access fee. Since C is strictly decreasing in 
, this will be true for all

  
( c;v), where 
(c)  C 1(
). It is straightforward to solve for

(c) =




) >  c (or equivalently 
 < 
( c;v)), the politician is unable to set his preferred access fee.
When this is the case, he can choose to set the access fee at some value less than  c, set the fee equal to  c, or
not grant any access.
First, I establish that for 
 < 
( c;v), the politician sets either c =  c, or c = ;. To establish this, it is
sucient to show that EUP is strictly increasing in c for all c   c; which means thatc =  c results in higher
EUP than any c <  c, and which rules out any fee less than the limit. Expression 6 gives the equation for







v , which is clearly negative. Access fee c = C(
) solves @EUP
@c = 0.
Given the concavity of EUP, for any c < C, EUP is increasing in c. Since  c < C and EUP is increasing
in c for c < C, EUP is also increasing in c for all c   c. Therefore, for 
 < 
( c;v), the politician prefers
to set c =  c than any lower fee.
For 
 < 
( c;v), the politician sets c =  c or chooses not to sell access. Setting c =  c results in

















( c   ).
Not selling access (i.e., c = ;) results in EUP(;) =  


3. Let  
 denote the issue importance for which the























( c   ).





4c2 + 2cv + v2.
Note that  gamma < 
( c;v). As I've already established, for 
  
( c;v), the politician sets access fee
equal to C(
), which is less than  c for this range of 
. For 
 2 [ 
( c;v);
( c;v)], EUP(;) < EUP( c) and the
30politician will choose to sell access at c =  c rather than not sell access. For 
 <  
, EUP( c) < EUP(;) and
the politician will choose to not sell any access than to sell access at fee c =  c.












where  e(c) is the cuto evidence quality associated with fee c, such the interest group buys access i eh >  e(c).
When the politician sets access fee c, I've already established that  e(c) = 2c
v . Therefore, expected welfare















( c;v), the politician sells access at fee C(
). When 
 2 [ 
( c;v);
( c;v)], the politician
sells access at fee  c. In both of these cases, it is straightforward to calculate EW c given expression 23. When

 <  
( c;v) the politician does not sell access, no interest group buys access, which is represented by  e(;) = 1.
For this case, it is straightforward to calculate EW c given expression 22.
Proof. (Prop. 4) The lower is  e, the more informed is the politician. As I have already established,
 e = 2c
v when the politician sells access at fee c, and  e = 1 when the politician does not sell access ( e = 1
means no interest group buys access). Lemma 1 gives EW c for each 
. Also, it has already been established



































( c;v), the politician sets fee c = C(
). This is the same access fee he sets when there is not
contribution limit. Therefore,  e(C
 c(
)) =  e(C(
)) (i.e., the politician receives the same information), and
EW(
) = EW c(
) (i.e., expected constituent welfare is unchanged). For 
 2 [ 
( c;v);
( c;v)], the politician
sets fee c =  c, where  c < C(
). Given that  c < C(
), it is straightforward to show that  e( c) <  e(C(
))
(i.e., the politician is better informed), and EW(
) < EW c(
) (i.e., expected constituent welfare increases).
For 
 <  
( c;v), the politician does not sell access. Therefore,  e(;) >  e(C(
)) (i.e., the politician is less
informed), and EW(
) > EW c(
) (i.e., expected constituent welfare decreases).
Proof. (Prop. 5) Let  c0 solve  
( c0) = 
. Prop. 3 establishes that at  c0 the politician sets access fee equal
to  c0. Also,  e( c0) 2 (0;1).
First, I establish that  c0 results in higher EW c compared to any lower  c. For all  c <  c0,  
( c;v) > 
;
therefore, the politician does not grant access and EW c =  












(see the proof to Prop. 4), and EW c(
) < EW c0(
) for all  c <  c0.
Second, I establish that  c0 results in higher EW c compared to any higher  c. Note that since 
 < 
( c0),
 c0 < C(
). If the new  c 2 ( c0;C(
)], then the politician sets the fee equal to  c. If the new  c  C(
),
31then the politician sets access fee equal to C(
), which is strictly greater than  c0. Either way, increasing
the contribution limit above  c0 results in a strictly higher access fee. As I've already established, a strictly
higher access fee increases  e, and decreases expected constituent welfare. EW c(
) < EW c0(
) for all  c >  c0.
Third, I establish that  c0 results in higher expected constituent welfare compared to setting no limit. If
there is no limit, the politician sets access fee equal to C(
), which I've shown is strictly higher than  c0. As
I've already established, a strictly higher access fee increases  e, and decreases expected constituent welfare.
EW(
) < EW c0(
).
Proof. (Prop. 8) First, I establish that  c = 
 results in higher expected constituent welfare than no limit
or any  c > 
. Note that  







































For any  c > 
,  
( c;v) < 0. Therefore,






































Note that EW(=) > EW c >(=) i EW(=)   EW c >(=) > 0. For any  c > =,













































(=)), it follows that EW(=)   EW c >(=) > 0. Thus, a
contribution limit equal to 
 results in higher expected constituent welfare than any higher limit.
Setting no limit results in


















Note that EW(=) > EWno limit i EW(=)   EWno limit > 0.
























(=)), it follows that EW(=)   EWno limit > 0. Thus, a contribution limit
equal to 
 results in higher expected constituent welfare than imposing no limit. Therefore, the optimal
limit  co 2 [0;=].
I will now show that  co 6= 
 and  co 6= 0. To do so, it is sucient to show that @EW c
@ c
 




 c=(=) < 0. That EW c is a continuous, smooth function between 0 and = assures that the function
achieves a maximum on this interval.

















Note that  
(0) = 12 > 0; g(
) > 0 for all positive 
 including 
 = 12; and  




 c=0 > 0. This means that a marginally positive contribution limit results in higher expected con-




















































which is strictly negative. Therefore, setting a contribution limit just below 
 results in strictly higher
expected constituent welfare than setting a contribution limit equal to 
. Thus,  co 6= 
 and  co 6= 0.
Together, these results establish that  co 2 (0;=).
Proof. (Cor. 1) Proposition 8 directly established that a contribution ban was never optimal, and that
it was always optimal to impose a contribution limit  c0 2 (0;=). It remains to be shown that any limit
 c 2 (0;=) results in the politician giving access for some, but not all, issues. To establish this, it is sucient
to show that  
 c > 0 for all  c in this range. Since  
0( c) < 0 for all possible limits, it is sucient to show that
 
(0) > 0 which implies that for any  c > 0,  
( c;v) will also be positive.  
(0) = 12 > 0, thus  
( c;v) > 12
for all  c > 0.
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